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Abstract
We consider profit-maximization problems for combinatorial auctions with non-single minded valu-
ation functions and limited supply. There are n customers and m items, each of which is available is in
some limited supply or capacity. Each customer j has a value vj(S) for each subset S of items specifying
the maximum amount she is willing to pay for that set (with vj(∅) = 0). A feasible solution to the profit-
maximization problem consists of item prices and an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) of items to customers such
that (i) the price of the set Sj assigned to j is at most vj(Sj), and (ii) the number of customers who are
allotted an item is at most its capacity. The goal is find a feasible solution that maximizes the total profit
earned by selling items to customers.
We obtain fairly general results that relate the approximability of the profit-maximization problem to
that of the corresponding social-welfare-maximization (SWM) problem, which is the problem of finding
an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) satisfying the capacity constraints that has maximum total value
∑
j vj(Sj).
For subadditive valuations (and hence submodular, XOS valuations), we obtain a solution with profit
OPTSWM/O(log cmax), where OPTSWM is the optimum social welfare and cmax is the maximum item-
supply; thus, this yields an O(log cmax)-approximation for the profit-maximization problem. Further-
more, given any class of valuation functions, if the SWM problem for this valuation class has an LP-
relaxation (of a certain form) and an algorithm “verifying” an integrality gap of α for this LP, then we
obtain a solution with profit OPTSWM/O(α log cmax), thus obtaining an O(α log cmax)-approximation.
The latter result immediately yields an O(
√
m log cmax)-approximation for the profit maximization
problem for combinatorial auctions with arbitrary valuations. As another application of this result, we
consider the non-single-minded tollbooth problem on trees (where items are edges of a tree, and cus-
tomers desire paths of the tree). We devise an O(1)-approximation algorithm for the corresponding
SWM problem satisfying the desired integrality-gap requirement, and thereby obtain an O(log cmax)-
approximation for the non-single-minded tollbooth problem on trees. For the special case, when the
tree is a path, we also obtain an incomparable O(logm)-approximation (via a different approach) for
subadditive valuations, and arbitrary valuations with unlimited supply. Our approach for the latter prob-
lem also gives an e
e−1
-approximation algorithm for the multi-product pricing problem in the Max-Buy
model, with limited supply, improving on the previously known approximation factor of 2.
1 Introduction
Profit (or revenue) maximization is a classic and fundamental economic goal, and the design of computationally-
efficient item-pricing schemes for various profit-maximization problems has received much recent atten-
tion [1, 20, 4, 2, 5, 3]. We study the algorithmic problem of item-pricing for profit-maximization for general
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(multi unit) combinatorial auctions (CAs) with limited supply. There are n customers and m items. Each
item is available is in some limited supply or capacity, and each customer j has a value vj(S) for each sub-
set S of items specifying the maximum amount she is willing to pay for that set (with vj(∅) = 0). Given a
pricing of the items, a feasible allocation is an assignment of a (possibly empty) subset Sj to each customer
j satisfying (i) the budget constraints, which require that the price of Sj (i.e., the total price of the items in
Sj) is at most vj(Sj), and (ii) the capacity constraints, which stipulate that the number of customers who are
allocated an item be at most the supply of that item. The objective is to determine item prices that maximize
the total profit or revenue earned by selling items to customers. Guruswami et al. [20] introduced the envy-
free version of the problem, where there is the additional constraint that the set assigned to a customer must
maximize her utility (defined as value−price). Item pricing has an appealing simplicity and enforces a ba-
sic notion of fairness wherein the seller does not discriminate between customers who get the same item(s).
Our focus on item pricing is in keeping with the vast majority of work on algorithms for profit-maximization
(e.g., the above references; in fact, with unlimited supply and unit-demand valuations, our problem reduces
to the Max-Buy model in [1]). Various current trading practices are described by item pricing, and thus
it becomes pertinent to understand what guarantees are obtainable via such schemes. Profit-maximization
problems are typically NP-hard, so we will be interested in designing approximation algorithms for these
problems. Throughout, a ρ-approximation algorithm for a maximization problem, where ρ ≥ 1, denotes a
polytime algorithm that returns a solution of value at least (optimum value)/ρ.
The framework of combinatorial auctions is an extremely rich framework that encapsulates a variety
of applications. In fact, recognizing the generality of the envy-free profit-maximization problem for CAs,
Guruswami et al. proceeded to study various more-tractable special cases of the problem. In particular, they
introduced the following two structured problems in the single-minded (SM) setting, where each customer
desires a single fixed set: (a) the tollbooth problem where the items are edges of a graph and the customer-
sets correspond to paths in this graph, which can be interpreted as the problem of pricing transportation links
or network connections. (b) a further special case called the highway problem where the graph is a path,
which can also be motivated from a scheduling perspective (the path corresponds to a time-horizon). The
non-SM versions of even such structured problems can be used to capture various interesting scenarios. For
instance, in a computer network, users may consider different possibilities for connecting to the network,
and the price they are willing to pay may depend on where they connect. The goal is to determine how to
price the bandwidth along the network links so as to maximize the profit obtained. For an application of
the non-single minded highway problem, consider customers who are interested in executing their jobs on a
machine(s) (or using a service, such as a hotel room). A customer is willing to pay for this service, but the
amount paid depends on when her job is scheduled. We want to price the time units and schedule the jobs
so as to maximize the profit.
Our results. We obtain fairly general polytime approximation guarantees for profit-maximization problems
involving combinatorial auctions with limited supply and non-single-minded valuations. We obtain results
for both (a) certain structured valuation classes, namely subadditive valuations (where v(A) + v(B) ≥
v(A ∪ B) for any two sets A,B) and hence, submodular valuations, which have been intensely studied
recently [14, 16, 3, 28, 10]; and (b) arbitrary valuations. Our results relate the approximability of the profit-
maximization problem to that of the corresponding social-welfare-maximization (SWM) problem, which
is the problem of finding an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) satisfying the capacity constraints that has maximum
total value
∑
j vj(Sj). Our main theorem, stated informally below and proved in Section 3, shows that
any LP-based approximation algorithm that provides an integrality-gap bound for the SWM problem with a
given class of valuations, can be leveraged to obtain a corresponding approximation guarantee for the profit-
maximization problem with that class of valuations. Let cmax ≤ n denote the maximum item supply, and
OPTSWM denote the optimum value of the SWM problem, which is clearly an upper bound on the maximum
profit achievable.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal statement). (i) For the class of subadditive (and hence submodular) valuations,
one can obtain a solution with profit OPTSWM/O(log cmax).
(ii) Given any class of valuations for which the corresponding SWM problem admits a packing-type LP
relaxation with an integrality gap of α as “verified” by an α-approximation algorithm, one can obtain a
solution with profit OPTSWM/O(α log cmax).
(Part (ii) above does not imply part (i), because for part (ii) we require an integrality-gap guarantee which,
roughly speaking, means that we require an algorithm that returns a “good” solution for every profile of n
valuations.)
A key notable aspect of our theorem is its versatility. One can simply “plug in” various known (or
easily derivable) results about the SWM problem to obtain approximation algorithms for various limited-
supply profit-maximization problems. For example, as corollaries of part (ii) of our theorem, we obtain
an O(
√
m log cmax)-approximation for profit-maximization for combinatorial auctions with arbitrary valu-
ations, and an O(log cmax)-approximation for the non-single-minded tollbooth problem on trees (see Sec-
tion 3.1). The first result follows from the various known O(√m)-approximation algorithms for the SWM
problem for CAs with arbitrary valuations that also bound the integrality gap [26, 23]. For the second re-
sult, we devise a suitable O(1)-approximation for the SWM problem corresponding to non-single-minded
tollbooth on trees, by adapting the randomized-rounding approach of Chakrabarty et al. [9].
Notice that with bundle-pricing, which is often used in the context of mechanism design for CAs, the
profit-maximization problem becomes equivalent to the SWM problem. Thus, our results provide worst-
case bounds on how item-pricing (which may be viewed as a fairness constraint on the seller) diminishes the
revenue of the seller versus bundle-pricing. It is also worth remarking that our algorithms for an arbitrary
valuation class (i.e., part (ii) above) can be modified in a simple way to return prices and an allocation
(S1, . . . , Sn) with the following ǫ-“one-sided envy-freeness” property while diminishing the profit by a
(1 − ǫ)-factor: for every non-empty Sj , the utility that j obtains from Sj is at least ǫ times the maximum
utility j may obtain from any set (see Remark 3.7).
The only previous guarantees for limited-supply CAs with a general valuation-class are those obtained
via a reduction in [2], showing that an α-approximation for the SWM problem and an algorithm for the
unlimited-supply SM problem that returns profit at least OPTSWM/β yield an αβ-approximation. A simple
“grouping-by-density” approach gives β = O(logm+logn); using the best known bound on β [5] yields an
O
(
α(logm+ log cmax)
)
guarantee, which is significantly weaker than our guarantees. (E.g., we obtain an
O(α)-approximation for constant cmax.) The O(log cmax)-factor we incur is unavoidable if one compares
the profit against the optimal social welfare: a well-known example with one item, n = cmax players
shows a gap of Hcmax := 1 + 12 + · · · + 1cmax between the optima of the SWM- and profit-maximization
problems. Almost all results for profit-maximization for CAs with non-SM valuations also compare against
the optimum social welfare, so they also incur this factor. Also, it is easy to see that with cmax = 1, the profit-
maximization problem reduces to the SWM problem, so an inapproximability result for the SWM problem
also yields an inapproximability result for our problem. Thus, we obtain an m
1
2
-, or n-, inapproximability
for CAs with even SM valuations (see, e.g., [19]), and APX-hardness for CAs with subadditive, submodular
valuations, and the tollbooth problem on trees.
The proof of Theorem 1.1 is based on considering a natural LP-relaxation (P) for the SWM problem
and its dual. A crucial observation is that an optimal primal solution combined with the optimal values
of the dual variables corresponding to the primal supply constraints can be seen as furnishing a “feasible”
solution with a fractional allocation to (even) the (envy-free) profit-maximization problem. [12] utilized
this observation to design an approximation algorithm for the single-minded envy-free profit-maximization
problem. But even with unit capacities and one non-single-minded customer, there is an Ω(m)-factor gap
between the optimum (integer or fractional) social-welfare and the optimum profit achievable by an envy-
free pricing (see, e.g., [3]). Our approach is similar to the one in [12], but as suggested by the above fact,
we need new ingredients to exploit the greater flexibility afforded by the profit-maximization problem (vs.
the envy-free problem) and turn the above observation into an approximation algorithm even for non-single-
minded valuations. As in [12], we argue that there must be an optimal dual solution with suitable, possibly
lowered, item-capacities yielding profit (with the fractional allocation) comparable to OPTSWM. A suitable
rounding of the optimal primal solution with these capacities then yields a good allocation, which combined
with the prices obtained yields the desired approximation bounds. Here, for part (ii) of Theorem 1.1, we
leverage a decomposition technique of [8]. Thus, our work shows that (in contrast to the envy-free setting)
for profit-maximization problems, one can obtain a great deal of mileage from the LP-relaxation of the
SWM problem and exploit LP-based techniques to obtain guarantees even for various non-single-minded
valuation classes.
In Section 4, we consider an alternate approach for the non-SM highway problem that (does not use
OPTSWM as an upper bound and) achieves an (incomparable) O(logm)-approximation factor. We decom-
pose the instance via an exponential-size configuration LP, which is solved approximately using the ellipsoid
method and rounded via randomized rounding. Here, we use LP duality to handle dependencies arising from
the non-SM setting.
Theorem 1.2. There is an O(logm)-approximation algorithm for the non-single-minded highway problem
with (i) subadditive valuations with limited supply; and (ii) arbitrary valuations with unlimited supply.
It is worth noting that the non-SM highway problem with subadditive valuations can be used to capture
some multi-product pricing problems in the so-called Max-Buy model (a customer buys the most expensive
product she can afford), with or without a price ladder, considered by Aggarwal et al. [1]. (Indeed, the case
without a ladder (resp., with a ladder) can be modeled by a set of disjoint intervals (resp., a Laminar set of
intervals sharing the right end-point), where customers’ valuations are defined on each of these intervals). In
fact, our algorithm in Theorem 1.2 is based on combining ideas from the PTAS for the version with a price
ladder in [1], and the ee−1 -approximation algorithm for the one without a ladder. We observe that our method
gives the following result1 for the multi-product pricing problem, which improves on the 2-approximation
result in [6].
Corollary 1.3. There is an ee−1 -approximation algorithm for the multi-product pricing problem in the Max-
Buy model, with limited supply.
Related work. There has been a great deal of recent work on approximation algorithms for various kinds
of pricing problems; see, e.g., [1, 3, 12, 10, 20, 6, 18, 15], and the references therein. However, to our
knowledge, the only approximation results for profit-maximization for non-single-minded CAs with (gen-
eral) limited supply (i.e., not necessarily unit- or unlimited- supply) are: (1) those gleaned from the reduction
in [2] coupled with the guarantee in [5]; and (2) the 2-approximation algorithm of [6] for unit-demand val-
uations (where each customer wants at most one item). (For this very structured subclass of submodular
valuations, this 2-approximation result is better than the guarantee we obtain using Theorem 1.1; hopwever,
our method .) We briefly survey the work in three special cases that have been studied: unit supply, unlimited
supply, and single-minded (SM) valuations.
As remarked earlier, with unit capacities, the profit-maximization problem reduces to the SWM problem,
which is a relatively well-studied problem. The approximation guarantees known for the SWM problem for
CAs with unit capacities are (i) 2 for subadditive valuations [16]; (ii) ee−1 [14, 28] for submodular valuations;
and (iii) Θ(√m) for arbitrary valuations [26, 23]. Recently, Balcan et al. [3] and Chakraborty et al. [10]
considered the unit-capacity problem with subadditive valuations in the online setting where customers
arrive online and select their utility-maximizing set from the unallotted items given the current prices. The
guarantees they obtain in this constrained setting are naturally worse than the guarantees known in the
1This result was recently rediscovered in [17].
offline setting. The unlimited-supply setting with arbitrary valuations has been less studied; [3] gave an
O(logm+ log n)-approximation algorithm by extending an algorithm in [20] for SM valuations.
The single-minded profit-maximization problem has received much attention. The work that is most
relevant to ours is Cheung and Swamy [12], who obtain an approximation guarantee of the same flavor as
in part (ii) of Theorem 1.1. They obtain an envy-free solution of profit OPTSWM/O(α log cmax) using an
LP-based α-approximation for the SWM problem (in the SM setting, this is equivalent to the integrality-gap
requirement we have); we make use of portions of their analysis in proving our results. For the unlimited-
supply SM problem, [20] gave an O(logm + log n)-approximation guarantee, which was improved by
Briest and Krysta [5]. A variety of approximation results based on dynamic programming have been ob-
tained [20, 21, 4, 5, 19] that yield exact algorithms or approximation schemes for various restricted instances,
or pseudopolynomial or quasipolynomial time algorithms. On the hardness side, a reduction from the set-
packing problem shows that achieving an approximation factor better than m 12 , or n, is NP-hard even when
cmax = 1, even for the (SM) tollbooth problem on grid graphs [19], and [13, 5, 20, 11] prove various
hardness results for unlimited-supply instances.
Finally, we note that the singe-minded version of the highway problem admits a PTAS in the unlimited
supply case [18] and a quasi-PTAS for the limited supply case [15] (with an ǫ-approximate notion of envy-
freeness), while the non-single minded version is APX-hard (since it includes the multi-product pricing
problem which was proved to be APX-hard in the Max-Buying setting in [1]).
2 Problem definition and preliminaries
Profit-maximization problems for combinatorial auctions. The general setup of profit-maximization
problems for (multi unit) combinatorial auctions (CAs) is as follows. There are n customers and m items.
Let [n] := {1, . . . , n} and [m] := {1, . . . ,m}. Each item e is available in some limited supply or capacity
ce. Each customer j has a valuation function vj : 2[m] 7→ R+, where vj(S) specifies the maximum amount
that customer j is willing to pay for the set S; equivalently this is j’s value for receiving the set S of items.
We assume that vj(∅) = 0; we often assume for convenience that vj(S) ≤ vj(T ) for S ⊆ T , but this
monotonicity requirement is not crucial for our results. The objective is to find non-negative prices pe ≥ 0
for the items, and an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) of items to customers (where Sj could be empty) so as to
maximize the total profit
∑
j∈[n]
∑
e∈Sj
pe =
∑
e∈[m] pe|{j : e ∈ Sj}| while satisfying the following two
constraints.
• Budget constraints. Each customer j can afford to buy her assigned set: p(Sj
)
:=
∑
e∈Sj
pe ≤ vj
(
Sj
)
.
• Capacity constraints. Each element e is assigned to at most ce customers: |{j ∈ [n] : e ∈ Sj}| ≤ ce.
Since the valuations may be arbitrary set functions, an explicit description of the input may require expo-
nential (in m) space. Hence, we assume that the valuations are specified via an oracle. As is standard in
the literature on combinatorial auctions and profit-maximization problems (see, e.g., [24, 16, 3, 10]), we
assume that a valuation v is specified by a demand oracle, which means that given item prices {pe}, the
demand-oracle returns a set S that maximizes the utility v(S) − p(S). We use cmax := maxe ce to denote
the maximum item supply.
An LP relaxation. We consider a natural linear programming (LP) relaxation (P) of the SWM problem
for combinatorial auctions, and its dual (D). Throughout, we use j to index customers, e to index items, and
S to index sets of items. We use the terms supply and capacity, and customer and player interchangeably.
max
∑
j,S
vj(S)xj,S (P)
s.t.
∑
S
xj,S ≤ 1 ∀j (1)
∑
j
∑
S:e∈S
xj,S ≤ ce ∀e (2)
xj,S ≥ 0 ∀j, S
min
∑
e
ceye +
∑
j
zj (D)
s.t.
∑
e∈S
ye + zj ≥ vj(S) ∀j, S
ye, zj ≥ 0 ∀e, j.
In the primal LP, we have a variable xj,S for each customer j and set S that indicates if j receives set S, and
we relax the integrality constraints on these variables to obtain the LP relaxation. The dual (D) has variables
zj and ye for each customer j and element e respectively, which correspond to the primal constraints (1)
and (2) respectively. Although (D) has an exponential number of constraints, it can be solved efficiently
given demand oracles for the valuations as these oracles yield the desired separation oracle for (D). This
in turn implies that (P) can be solved efficiently. We say that an algorithm A for the SWM problem is an
LP-based α-approximation algorithm for a class V of valuations if for every instance involving valuation
functions (v1, . . . , vn), where each vj ∈ V , A returns an integer solution of value at least LP-optimum/α.
For example, the algorithm in [16] is an LP-based 2-approximation algorithm for the class of subadditive
valuations.
Definition 2.1. We say that an algorithm A for the SWM problem “verifies” an integrality gap of (at most)
α for an LP-relaxation of the SWM problem (e.g.,(P)), if for every profile of (monotonic) valuation functions
(v1, . . . , vn), A returns an integer solution of value at least (LP-optimum)/α.
As emphasized above, an integrality-gap-verifying algorithm above must “work” for every valuation-
profile. (Note that for the SWM problem, one can always assume that the valuation is monotonic, since
we can always move from a set to its subset (as items may be left unallotted).) In particular, an LP-based
α-approximation algorithm for a given structured class of valuations (e.g., submodular or subadditive valu-
ations) does not verify the integrality gap for the LP-relaxation. This is the precise reason why our guarantee
for subadditive valuations (part (i) of Theorem 1.1) does not follow from part (ii) of Theorem 1.1. In certain
cases however, one may be able to encapsulate the combinatorial structure of the SWM problem with a
structured valuation class by formulating a stronger LP-relaxation for the SWM problem, and thereby prove
that an approximation algorithm for the structured valuation class is in fact an integrality-gap-verifying ap-
proximation algorithm with respect to this stronger LP-relaxation. For example, in Section 3.1 we consider
the setting where items are edges of a tree and customers desire paths of the tree. This leads to the struc-
tured valuation where, for a set of edges T , v(T ) = max{v(P ) : P is a path in T} (with v(P ) ≥ 0 being
the value for path P ). We design an O(1)-approximation algorithm for such valuations, and formulate a
stronger LP for the corresponding SWM problem for which our algorithm verifies a constant integrality gap.
(For the SWM problem with subadditive valuations, it is not known how to exploit the underlying structure
and formulate an efficiently-solvable LP-relaxation with O(1) integrality gap.)
For a given instance I = (m,n, {vj}j∈[n], {c(e)}e∈[m]
)
, our algorithms will consider different capacity
vectors k ≤ c. We use (Pk) and (Dk) to denote respectively (P) and (D) with capacity-vector k = (ke),
and OPT(k) to denote their common optimal value. Let OPT := OPT(c) denote the optimum value of (P)
(and (D)) with the original capacities. We will utilize the following facts that follow from complementary
slackness, and a rounding result that follows from the work of Carr and Vempala [8], and was made explicit
in [24].
Claim 2.2. Let k = (ke) be any capacity-vector, and let x∗ and (y∗, z∗) be optimal solutions to (Pk) and
(Dk) respectively.
(i) If x∗j,S > 0, then
∑
e∈S y
∗
e ≤ vj(S);
(ii) If x∗j,S > 0, and vj is subadditive, then
∑
e∈T y
∗
e ≤ vj(T ) for any T ⊆ S;
(iii) If y∗e > 0, then
∑
j,S:e∈S x
∗
j,S = ke.
Proof. Parts (i) and (iii) follow directly from the complementary slackness (CS) conditions: part (i) follows
from the CS condition for x∗j,S , since z∗i ≥ 0; part (iii) uses the CS condition for y∗e and the corresponding
primal constraint (2). For part (ii), again, by the CS conditions we have ∑e∈S y∗e + z∗j = vj(S). Also, dual
feasibility implies that
∑
e∈S\T y
∗
e + z
∗
j ≥ vj(S \ T ). Subtracting this from the first equation and using
subadditivity yields
∑
e∈T y
∗
e ≤ vj(S)− vj(S \ T ) ≤ vj(T ).
Remark 2.3. As mentioned above, we will sometimes consider a different LP-relaxation when considering
the SWM problem with a structured class of valuations. Roughly speaking, the only properties we require
of this LP are that it should: (a) include a constraint similar to (2) that encodes the supply constraints; and
(b) be a packing LP, i.e., have the form Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0 where A is a nonnegative matrix. Given this, parts
(i) and (iii) of Claim 2.2 continue to hold with ye denoting (as before) the dual variable corresponding to the
supply constraint for item e, since the dual is then a covering LP.
Lemma 2.4 ([8, 24]). Given a fractional solution x to the LP-relaxation of an SWM problem that is a
packing LP (e.g., (Pk)), and a polytime integrality-gap-verifying α-approximation algorithm A for this LP,
one can express xα as a convex combination of integer solutions to the LP in polytime. In particular, one can
round x to a random integer solution xˆ satisfying the following “rounding property”: xj,Sα ≤ Pr[xˆj,S =
1] ≤ xj,S ∀j, S.
3 The main algorithm and its applications
Claim 2.2 leads to the simple, but important observation that if k ≤ c and the optimal primal solution x∗ is
integral, then by using {y∗e} as the prices, one obtains a feasible solution to the profit-maximization problem
with profit
∑
e key
∗
e . There are two main obstacles encountered in leveraging this observation and turning it
into an approximation algorithm. First, (Pk) will of course not in general have an integral optimal solution.
Second, it is not clear what capacity-vector k ≤ c to use: for instance, ∑e cey∗e could be much smaller
than OPT (it is easy to construct such examples), and in general, ∑e key∗e could be quite small for a given
capacity-vector k ≤ c. We overcome these difficulties by taking an approach similar to the one in [12].
We tackle the second difficulty by utilizing a key lemma proved by Cheung and Swamy [12], which
is stated in a slightly more general form in Lemma 3.2 so that it can be readily applied to various profit-
maximization problems. This lemma implies that one can efficiently compute a capacity-vector k ≤ c and
an optimal dual solution (y∗, z∗) to (Dk) such that
∑
e key
∗
e is
(
OPT − OPT(1))/O(log cmax), where 1
denotes the all-one’s vector (Corollary 3.4). To handle the first difficulty, notice that part (i) of Claim 2.2
implies that one can still use {y∗e} as the prices, provided we obtain an allocation (i.e., integer solution) xˆ
that only assigns a set S to customer j (i.e., xˆj,S = 1) if x∗j,S > 0. (In contrast, in the envy-free setting, if
we use {y∗e} as the prices then every customer j with z∗j > 0, and hence
∑
S x
∗
j,S = 1, must be assigned
a set S with x∗j,S > 0; this may be impossible with non-single-minded valuations, whereas this is easy
to accomplish with single-minded valuations (as there is only one set per customer).) Furthermore, for
subadditive valuations, part (ii) of Claim 2.2 shows that it suffices to obtain an allocation where xˆj,T = 1
implies that there is some set S ⊇ T with x∗j,S > 0. This is precisely what our algorithms do. We show
that one can round x∗ into an integer solution xˆ satisfying the above structural properties, and in addition
ensure that the profit obtained,
∑
j,T xˆj,T
(∑
e∈T y
∗
e
)
, is “close” to
∑
e key
∗
e (Lemma 3.5). So if
∑
e key
∗
e
is OPT/O(log cmax) then applying this rounding procedure to the optimal primal solution to (Pk) yields a
“good” solution. On the other hand, Corollary 3.4 implies that if this is not the case, then OPT(1) must be
large compared to OPT, and then we observe that an α-approximation to the SWM problem trivially yields
a solution with profit OPT(1)/α (Lemma 3.1). (As mentioned earlier, in the envy-free setting and unit
capacities, there can be an Ω(m)-gap between the optimum profit and the optimum social welfare.) Thus,
in either case we obtain the desired approximation.
The algorithm is described precisely in Algorithm 1. If we use an LP-relaxation different from (P)
for the SWM problem with a given valuation class that satisfies the properties stated in Remark 2.3, then
the only (obvious) change to Algorithm 1 is that we now use this LP and its dual (with the appropriate
capacity-vector) instead of (P) and (D) above.
Algorithm 1 Non-single-minded profit-maximization
Input: a profit-maximization instance I = (m,n, {vj}, {ce}
)
with a demand oracle for each valuation vj
1. Define k1, k2, . . . , kℓ as the following capacity-vectors. Let k1e = 1 ∀e. For j > 1, let
kje = min
{⌈(1 + ǫ)kj−1e ⌉, ce
}
; let ℓ be the smallest index such that kℓ = c.
2. For each vector k = kj, j = 1, . . . , ℓ, compute an optimal solution (y(k), z(k)) to (Dk). Select u ∈
{k1, . . . , kℓ} that maximizes ∑e uey(u)e .
3. Compute an optimal solution x(u) to (Pu). Use Round(u, x(u)) to convert x(u) to a feasible allocation.
4. Use an LP-based α-approximation algorithm for the SWM problem (with the given valuation class) to
compute an α-approximate solution to the SWM problem with unit capacities, and a pricing scheme for
this allocation that yields profit equal to the social-welfare value of the allocation.
5. Return the better of the following two solutions: (1) allocation computed in step 3 with {y(u)e } as the
prices; (2) allocation and pricing scheme computed in step 4.
Round(µ = (µe), x
∗)
Subadditive valuations: First, independently for each player j, assign j at most one set S by choosing
set S with probability x∗j,S . If an item e gets allotted to more than µe customers this way, then arbitrarily
select µe customers from among these customers and assign e to these customers. Given item prices,
this algorithm can be derandomized via the method of conditional expectations.
General valuation class: Given an integrality-gap-verifying α-approximation algorithm (for (Pµ)),
use Lemma 2.4 to decompose x∗α into a convex combination
∑ℓ
r=1 λrxˆ
r of integer solutions to (Pµ).
(Here ∑r λr = 1 and λr ≥ 0 for each r.) Return xˆ(r) with probability λr. Given item prices, this al-
gorithm can be derandomized by choosing the solution in {xˆ(1), . . . , xˆ(r)} achieving maximum profit.
Analysis. The analysis of Algorithm 1 for both subadditive valuations and a general valuation class pro-
ceeds very similarly with the only point of difference being in the analysis of the rounding procedure
(Lemma 3.5). First, observe that if we have an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) that is feasible with unit capaci-
ties, then since the sets Sj are disjoint we can charge each customer her valuation for the assigned set by
pricing one of her items at this value, and hence, obtain profit equal to the social-welfare value
∑
j vj(Sj)
of the allocation.
Lemma 3.1. Given an LP-based α-approximation algorithm for the SWM problem with a given valuation
class, one can compute a solution that achieves profit at least OPT(1)/α.
Lemma 3.2 ([12] paraphrased). Let (Ck) denote the LP: min kT y + bT z s.t. (y, z) ∈ P ⊆ Rm+n+ , where
k, y ∈ Rm+ , b, z ∈ Rn+, P 6= ∅. Let (y(k), z(k)) be an optimal solution to (Ck) that maximizes kT y among
all optimal solutions, and opt(k) denote the optimal value. Let k1, . . . , kℓ, and u be as defined in steps 1
and 2 respectively of Algorithm 1. Then, ∑e uey(u)e ≥
(
opt(c)− opt(1))/(2(1 + ǫ)Hcmax
)
.
Proof. We mimic the proof in [12]. First, note that opt(k) is well-defined for all k ≥ 0.
For j > 1, define dj = kj − kj−1. Note that 0 ≤ dje ≤ kje for all e. Let e∗ be an item with ce∗ = cmax.
Claim 3.3. For any j > 1, we have dje∗/k
j
e∗ = maxe(d
j
e/k
j
e) and dje∗/k
j−1
e∗ = maxe(d
j
e/k
j−1
e ).
Proof. It is easy to argue the following by induction on j: (i) if kj−1e < ce and kj−1e′ < ce′ , then kj−1e =
kj−1e′ ; and (ii) if ce ≤ ce′ , then kje ≤ kje′ and dje ≤ dje′ . It is clear that dje > 0 iff kj−1e < ce, and that
kj−1e∗ < ce∗ for all j > 1. Combining these facts, for any e with dje > 0, we have kj−1e < ce and so
kj−1e = k
j−1
e∗ , and since ce ≤ ce∗ , we have kje ≤ kje∗ and dje ≤ dje∗ . Thus,
dj
e∗
kj
e∗
≥ dje
kje
and d
j
e∗
kj−1
e∗
≥ dje
kj−1e
.
Let P =
∑
e uey
(u)
e = maxk=k1,...,kℓ
∑
e key
(k)
e . Then, for every j > 1, we have
P · d
j
e∗
kj−1e∗
≥ opt(kj)− opt(kj−1). (3)
This follows because, considering (y, z) =
(
y(k
j−1), z(k
j−1)
)
, which is a feasible solution for (Ckj) and an
optimal solution for (Ckj−1), the RHS is at most
∑
e d
j
eye ≤ maxe d
j
e
kj−1e
·∑e kj−1e ye ≤ d
j
e∗
kj−1
e∗
P , where the
last inequality follows again from Claim 3.3 and since
∑
e k
j−1
e ye ≤ P .
Since kje∗ ≤ 2(1 + ǫ)kj−1e∗ , we can upper bound the coefficient of P in the above inequality by 2(1 +
ε)
∑kj
e∗
t=kj−1
e∗
+1
1/t. Thus, adding (3) for all j > 1 gives P · 2(1 + ǫ)(Hcmax − 1
) ≥ opt(c)− opt(1).
Corollary 3.4. The capacity-vector u computed in step 2 of Algorithm 1 satisfies the inequality∑e uey(u)e ≥(
OPT(c)− OPT(1))/(2(1 + ǫ)Hcmax
)
.
We now analyze the rounding procedure for general and subadditive valuations. Together with Lemma 3.1
and Corollary 3.4, this yields Theorem 3.6.
Lemma 3.5. Let xˆ be the (random) integer solution returned by procedure Round in step 3 of Algorithm 1.
Then xˆ combined with the pricing scheme y(u) is a feasible solution to the profit-maximization problem with
probability 1, which achieves expected profit at least (i) (1− 1e
)∑
e uey
(u)
e for subadditive valuations; and
(ii) ∑e uey(u)e /α for a general valuation class.
Proof. Feasibility is immediate from Claim 2.2 since if a player j is assigned a set S then (i) for a general
class of valuations, x(u)j,S > 0, and (ii) for subadditive valuations, there is some set T ⊇ S such that x(u)j,T > 0.
The bound on the profit with a general valuation class follows from part (iii) of Claim 2.2 since each item e is
assigned to an expected number of
(∑
j,S:e∈S x
(u)
j,S
)
/α players. Note that we only need the rounding property
in Lemma 2.4 (and not how it is obtained). To lower-bound the profit achieved with subadditive valuations,
we show that the expected number of players who are allotted an item f is at least
(
1 − 1e
)∑
j,S:f∈S x
(u)
j,S
(here, e is the base of the natural logarithm). Notice that this implies the claim since the expected profit is
then at least
(
1 − 1e
)∑
f y
(u)
f
(∑
j,S:f∈S x
(u)
j,S
)
=
(
1 − 1e
)∑
f ufy
(u)
f (where the last equality follows from
part (iii) of Claim 2.2).
Let X = (Xj,S) be the random, possibly infeasible solution computed after the first rounding step. Now
fix an item f . To avoid clutter, we use xj and Xj below as shorthand for
∑
S:f∈S x
(u)
j,S and
∑
S:f∈S Xj,S
respectively. Also, let gj = xjuf . The expected number of players who are allotted item f after the subsequent
“cleanup” step is
E[min{uf ,
∑
j
Xj}] = x1
(
1 + E
[
min{uf − 1,
∑
j≥2
Xj}
])
+ (1− x1)E
[
min{uf ,
∑
j≥2
Xj}
]
≥ x1 + E
[
min{uf ,
∑
j≥2
Xj}
](
x1 · uf−1uf + 1− x1
)
= x1 +
(
1− x1uf
)
E
[
min{uf ,
∑
j≥2
Xj}
]
≥ uf
(
g1 + (1− g1)g2 + · · · + (1− g1) . . . (1− gn−1)gn
)
= uf
(
1−
n∏
j=1
(1− gj)
)
Thus, E
[
min{uf ,
∑
j Xj}
] ≥ uf
(
1− (1−
∑
j gj
n
)n) ≥ uf
(
1− (1 − 1n)n
)∑
j gj ≥
(
1− 1e
)∑
j xj . Here
the penultimate inequality follows from the fact that 1 − (1 − an
)n is a concave function of a, and hence is
at least
(
1− (1− 1n)n
)
a when a ∈ [0, 1] (note that ∑j gj ≤ 1).
Theorem 3.6. Algorithm 1 runs in time poly
(
input size, 1ǫ
)
and achieves an
(i) O(log cmax)-approximation for subadditive valuations, using the 2-approximation algorithm for the
SWM problem with subadditive valuations in [16];
(ii) O(α log cmax)-approximation for a general valuation class given an integrality-gap-verifying α-approximation
algorithm for the SWM problem.
Proof. By Lemmas 3.1, 3.5, and Corollary 3.4, for subadditive valuations, the profit obtained is at least
max
{OPT(1)
2 , (1 − 1e )(OPT(c) − OPT(1))/(2(1 + ǫ)Hcmax)
} ≥ OPT(c)/(4(1 + ǫ)Hcmax
)
. Similarly for a
general valuation class, we obtain profit at least 1α ·max
{
OPT(1), (OPT(c)−OPT(1))/(2(1+ ǫ)Hcmax )
} ≥
OPT(c)/
(
4α(1 + ǫ)Hcmax
)
.
Remark 3.7. Note that if the allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) returned by Algorithm 1 is obtained via Round, then Sj
is always a subset of a utility-maximizing set of j, and with a general valuation class, if Sj 6= ∅, it is a utility-
maximizing set (under the computed prices). (For submodular valuations, this implies that vj(Sj)− vj(Sj \
{e}) ≥ (price of e) for all e ∈ Sj .) If (S1, . . . , Sn) is obtained in step 4, then we may assume that vj(Sj) =
maxT⊆Sj vj(T ) (since we have a demand oracle for vj); with a general valuation class, this solution can
be modified to yield an approximate “one-sided envy-freeness” property. We compute (S1, . . . , Sn) by
rounding x(1) as described in Lemma 2.4. Now choose prices {p′e} (arbitrarily) such that p′ ≥ y(1) and
p′(Sj) = max{y(1)(Sj), (1 − ǫ)vj(Sj)} for every j. Since any non-empty Sj is a utility-maximizing set
under y(1), it follows that (a) p′ is a valid item-pricing yielding profit at least (1 − ǫ)∑j vj(Sj); (b) if
Sj 6= ∅, then the utility j derives from Sj under p′ is at least ǫ(max utility of j under p′).
These properties prevent a kind of “cheating” that may occur in profit-maximization problems. To
elaborate, although monotonicity of the valuation is an innocuous assumption for the SWM problem, with
profit-maximization this can lead to the following artifact: a customer j desires a set A but is allotted B ⊇ A
(with vj(B) = vj(A)) and items in A have 0 price and items in B \ A have positive prices, so that j ends
up paying for items she never wanted! The above properties ensure that (we may assume that) the solution
computed by our algorithm does not have this artifact. In fact, if j desires one of k sets A1, . . . , Ak, then
our algorithm will assign j a set Sj ∈ {∅, A1, . . . , Ak}. We could also prevent this artifact by dropping
monotonicity of the valuations.
3.1 Applications
Arbitrary valuation functions. The integrality gap of (P) is known to be Θ(√m), and there are efficient
(deterministic) algorithms that verify this integrality gap [26, 23]. So Theorem 3.6 immediately yields an
O(
√
m log cmax)-approximation algorithm for the profit-maximization problem for combinatorial auctions
with arbitrary valuations.
Non-single-minded tollbooth problem on trees. In this profit-maximization problem, items are edges
of a tree and customers desire paths of the tree. More precisely, let P denote the set of all paths in the
tree (including ∅). Each customer j has a value vj(S) ≥ 0 for path S ∈ P, and may be assigned any
(one) path of the tree. Notice that this leads to the structured valuation function vj : 2[m] 7→ R+ where
vj(T ) = max{vj(S) : S is a path in T}. Note that vj need not be subadditive. We use Algorithm 1 to
obtain an O(log cmax)-approximation guarantee by formulating an LP-relaxation of the SWM problem that
is tailored to this setting and designing an O(1)-integrality-gap-verifying algorithm for this LP.
The “new” LP is almost identical to (P), except that we now only have variables xj,S for S ∈ P .
Correspondingly, in the dual (D), we only have a constraint for (j, S) when S ∈ P. Clearly, this new LP
satisfies the properties stated in Remark 2.3, so parts (i) and (iii) of Claim 2.2 hold for this new LP, and so
does Lemma 2.4. Thus, we only need to design an O(1)-integrality-gap-verifying algorithm for this new LP
to apply Theorem 3.6. Let {vj : P 7→ R+}j∈[n] be any instance and x∗ be an optimal solution to this new LP
for this instance. We design a randomized algorithm that returns a (random) integer solution xˆ of expected
objective value Ω(∑j,S∈P vj(S)x∗j,S). This algorithm can be derandomized using the work of [27]; this
yields an O(1)-integrality-gap-verifying algorithm for the new LP. (We have not attempted to optimize the
approximation factor.) Our algorithm is a generalization of the one proposed by [9] for unsplittable flow
on a line. Root the tree at an arbitrary node. Define the depth of an edge (a, b) to be the minimum of the
distances of a and b to the root. Define the depth of an edge-set T to be the minimum depth of any edge in
T . Let α = 0.01.
1. Independently, for every customer j, choose at most one set (i.e., path) S, by picking S with probability
αx∗j,S . Let Sj be the set assigned to j. (If j is unassigned, then Sj = ∅.)
2. Let W = ∅. Consider the sets {Sj} in non-decreasing order of their depth (breaking ties arbitrarily).
For each set T = Sj , if T can be added to {Si : i ∈ W} without violating any capacities, add j to W ;
otherwise discard T .
Let xˆ be the (random) integer solution computed. Using a similar argument as in [9], we prove in Ap-
pendix A that if we select α = 0.01, then Pr[xˆj,S = 1] ≥ 0.00425x∗j,S , so E
[∑
j,S∈P vj(S)xˆj,S
] ≥
0.00425 ·∑j,S∈P vj(S)x∗j,S . We thus obtain the following theorem as a corollary of Theorem 3.6.
Theorem 3.8. There is an O(1)-integrality-gap-verifying algorithm (for the new LP mentioned above). This
yields an O(log cmax)-approximation algorithm for the non-single-minded tollbooth problem on trees.
We remark that since the above algorithm satisfies the rounding property in Lemma 2.4, we can directly
use it to round x(u) (more efficiently) to a feasible allocation in step 3 of Algorithm 1, instead of using the
Carr-Vempala decomposition procedure (which relies on the ellipsoid method).
4 Refinement for the non-single-minded highway problem
In this section, we describe a different approach that does not use OPTSWM as an upper bound on the
optimum profit. Instead our approach is based on using an exponential-size configuration LP to decom-
pose the original instance into various smaller (and easier) instances. We use this to obtain an O(logm)-
approximation for the non-single-minded (non-SM) highway problem (recall that this is the tollbooth prob-
lem on a path, so customers desire intervals) with subadditive valuations, and arbitrary valuations but unlim-
ited supply (Theorem 1.2). Note that this is incomparable to the O(log n)-approximation obtained earlier
for the tollbooth problem on trees (as cmax ≤ n); the number of distinct sets is O(m2) but the number of
customers can be much larger (or smaller). Also, an O(logm)-approximation is impossible to obtain using
the approach in Section 3, and in general any approach that uses the optimum of the (integer or fractional)
SWM problem as an upper bound, because, as mentioned earlier, there is a simple example with just one
item and cmax = n, where the SWM-optimum is an Hcmax-factor away from the optimum profit. Let P
be the set of all intervals on the line (with m edges). As with the non-SM tollbooth problem on trees (in
Section 3.1), each customer j has a value for each subpath (which is now an interval). So we view vj as a
function vj : P 7→ R+, and subadditivity means that for any two intervals A, B, where A ∪ B is also an
interval, we have vj(A ∪B) ≤ vj(A) + vj(B).
We outline the proof of Theorem 1.2. First, we use a simple procedure (Proposition 4.1) to partition the
intervals into O(logm) disjoint sets, where each set is a union of item-disjoint “cliques”. Here, a clique
is a set of paths that share a common edge; two cliques P1 and P2 are item-disjoint, if A ∩ B = ∅ for all
A ∈ P1, B ∈ P2.
Proposition 4.1 (see [7]). A set of k intervals on the line can be partitioned into at most ⌊log(k + 1)⌋ sets,
each of which is a union of item-disjoint cliques.
Thus, we can decompose P into O(logm) sets; to get an O(logm)-approximation algorithm, it suffices to
give an O(1)-approximation algorithm when the intervals form a union of item-disjoint cliques. It is unclear
how to achieve a near-optimal solution even in this structured setting, as there are various dependencies
between the cliques in a set: a customer can only be assigned an interval in one of the cliques. We solve
this “union-of-cliques” pricing problem as follows. We first trim each clique Pi in our set randomly to
a one-sided half-clique by (essentially) ignoring the items to the left or right of the common edge of Pi.
The details of this truncation are slightly different depending on whether we have subadditive or arbitrary
valuations (see the proof of Lemma 4.2), but a key observation is that, in expectation, we only lose a factor
of 2 by this truncation. We formulate an LP-relaxation for the pricing problem involving these half-cliques.
Solving this LP requires the ellipsoid method, where the separation oracle is provided by the solution to
another (easier) pricing problem, where the (half) cliques are now decoupled. We devise an algorithm based
on dynamic programming (DP) to compute a near-optimal solution to this pricing problem, which then
yields a near-optimal solution to the LP (Lemma 4.3). Finally, we argue that this near-optimal fractional
solution can be rounded to an integer solution losing only an O(1)-factor (Lemma 4.4). Combining the
various ingredients, we obtain the desired O(1)-approximation for the “union-of-cliques” pricing problem,
which in turn yields an O(logm)-approximation for our original non-single-minded highway problem.
We assume in the following that the edges of the line are numbered 1, 2, . . . ,m, from left to right.
Lemma 4.2. There is a 16(1+ 1m )-approx. algorithm for the non-SM highway problem when intervals form
a union of item-disjoint cliques for (i) subadditive valuations with limited supply; (ii) arbitrary valuations
with unlimited supply.
Proof. Let A = ⋃i Pi be a set of intervals where the Pis are item-disjoint cliques. Let ei denote the
common edge of Pi, and ℓi and ri be the leftmost and rightmost edge used by some interval of Pi. We first
trim the cliques to one-sided half-cliques. For every clique Pi independently, we discard one of the “halves”
of Pi with probability 1/2. More precisely, for subadditive valuations, discarding the right half means that
we truncate each interval S ∈ Pi to S ∩ [ℓi, ei] to obtain the half-clique Hi of truncated intervals; when
discarding the left half we set Hi = {S ∩ [ei + 1, ri] : S ∈ Pi}. For arbitrary valuations with unlimited
supply, discarding the right half is defined to simulate the effect of pricing all edges in [ei + 1, ri] at 0
(discarding the left half is symmetric). So in this case, we define the half-clique Hi to be {S ∪ [ei + 1, ri] :
S ∈ Pi} (note that there are no capacity constraints).
A key observation is that for both subadditive and arbitrary valuations, E
[
opt(Hi)
] ≥ opt(Pi)/2 for
every i, where opt(S) denotes the optimum profit when players may only be assigned intervals from S .
We now consider the problem of setting interval prices for the intervals in
⋃
iHi that of course obey
the constraint that p(S) ≤ p(T ) if S ⊆ T . First, we discretize the space of interval prices. Let B be the
maximum price any player may pay in a feasible solution. We consider only positive prices of the form
dq = B/2q, q ∈ Z≥0 for dq ≥ B/mn. We lose at most a factor of 2(1 + 1m ) this way (since we have item-
disjoint half-cliques). Now we have O(log n+ logm) different prices. Let Ri denote the set of all possible
solutions for Hi, where a solution specifies a pricing of the intervals in Hi (choosing non-zero prices from
{dq} or 0) and an allocation of intervals to customers satisfying the budget and capacity constraints. We
introduce a variable yjp ≥ 0 for each customer j and price p denoting if customer j buys a path at price p,
and a variable xi,R for each R ∈ Ri denoting whether solution R has been chosen for Hi. Let pj(R) be the
price that j pays under the solution R, and Ri,j,p =
{
R ∈ Hi : pj(R) = p
}
be the set of solutions for Hi
where j pays price p. We consider the following LP. Here p indexes all the possible interval-prices.
max
∑
j,p
p · yjp (P2)
s.t.
∑
R∈Ri
xi,R = 1 for all i
∑
p
yjp ≤ 1 for all j (4)
yjp ≤
∑
i,R:R∈Ri,j,p
xi,R for all j, p (5)
xi,R, yjp ≥ 0 for all i, R, j, p.
Constraint (4) ensures that a customer only buys at at most one price, and constraint (5) ensures that j
can only buy at price p if a solution R ∈ ⋃iRi,j,p has been selected. The arguments above establish that
OPT(P2) is at least 1/4
(
1+ 1m
)
-fraction of the optimum for the instance A (for both subadditive and arbitrary
valuations). We show that one can obtain an integer solution to (P2) of objective value at least OPT(P2)/4;
this will complete the proof.
(P2) has an exponential number of variables, so to solve it we consider the dual problem. The separation
oracle for the dual amounts to solving a related pricing problem where the half-cliques are now decoupled.
We give a 2-approximation algorithm for this problem, which then yields a 2-approximate dual solution,
and hence, a 2-approximate solution to (P2) (Lemma 4.3). Lemma 4.4 states that this fractional solution can
then be rounded to an integer solution losing at most another factor of 2. This completes the proof.
Lemma 4.3. One can compute a 2-approximate solution to (P2) in polynomial time.
Proof. We first show how to get a 2-approximate solution for the dual problem. This will also yield a
method to get a 2-approximate primal solution. Consider the dual program:
min
∑
i
αi +
∑
j
βj (D2)
s.t. βj + γjp ≥ p for all j, price p (6)∑
j,p:R∈Ri,j,p
γjp ≤ αi for all i, R ∈ Ri (7)
βj , γjp ≥ 0 for all j, price p. (8)
Note that (D2) has an exponential number of constraints. In order to solve (D2) efficiently, we use the
ellipsoid method, which reduces the problem of solving the LP to finding a separation oracle that, given a
candidate solution vector v = (α, β, γ), either produces a feasible solution (usually the input v) or returns a
constraint violated by v. Constraints (6) and (8) can easily be checked in polynomial time. In the following,
we will therefore assume that v satisfies these constraints. On the other hand, there are an exponential
number of constraints (7). It turns out that checking whether one of these constraints is violated amounts
to solving a generalized non-single-minded pricing instance: we seek to find a solution R ∈ Ri, such that∑
j,p:R∈Ri,j,p
γjp is maximized, i.e., a customer j who is allotted an interval priced at p contributes γjp
to the objective value. If the maximum achievable profit on some half-clique Hi is larger than αi, then
the corresponding solution yields a violated constraint. Otherwise all constraints are satisfied. Although it
seems that we have not gained much by reducing the original non-single-minded pricing problem to another
even more generalized pricing problem, the crucial point here is that we have removed the dependencies
between different (half) cliques. Instead of solving this problem with the given γ, we move to a slightly
more structured v˜ = (α, β, γ˜) to be specified shortly, such that if v˜ violates a constraint, then the same
constraint is also violated by v. Note also that v˜ and v have the same objective function value since they
share the same α and β values. We define γ˜jp := max{0, p − βj}. Note that γ ≥ γ˜ since we have assumed
that v satisfies the constraints (6) and (8). Hence, if v˜ violates one of the constraints (7), v also violates it.
We give a 2-approximation algorithm for this new pricing problem on a half-clique, which we call the
voucher-pricing problem. (The rationale is that βj can be viewed as a voucher that customer j can redeem
and thereby decrease her price). We describe the algorithm shortly, but first we show that this implies the
lemma. Using this approximation algorithm for the separation oracle yields a dual solution (α, β, γ) that is
potentially not feasible. In particular, it could violate the constraints (7), however only by a factor of at most
2. By scaling α accordingly, we get a feasible solution (2α, β, γ) whose objective function value is at most
2 · OPT(D2).
Now applying an argument similar to the one used by Jain et al. [22] shows that one can also compute a
2-approximate primal solution.
A 2-approximation algorithm for the voucher-pricing problem on a half-clique Hi. The algorithm
follows the dynamic-programming approach by Aggarwal et al. [1]. The main observation is that if we
relax the constraint that a customer buys (i.e., is assigned) at most one interval and only prevent her from
buying two intervals at the same price then we lose at most a factor of 2. To see this, note that since we have
discretized our search space of prices, if p is the maximum price paid by a customer j in a solution to the
relaxed problem (where she can buy multiple intervals), then j’s contribution to the profit is at most
∑
q≥0
max{p · 2−q − βj , 0} ≤
∑
q≥0
2−q ·max{p− βj , 0} since βj ≥ 0
≤ 2 ·max{p − βj , 0}
and if we assign j only the single interval at price p (note that this still satisfies the capacity constraints), we
get profit max{p− βj , 0}.
We solve this relaxed problem using dynamic programming. To keep notation simple, let T1 ⊇ T2 ⊇
. . . ⊇ Tℓ denote the intervals in Hi. So we require that p(T1) ≥ . . . ≥ p(Tℓ). Let dQ be the lowest non-zero
price in our discrete price-space, and let dQ+1 := 0.
Let F (q, i, U) denote the value of an optimal solution when customers are only assigned intervals from
from {Ti, . . . , Tℓ}, the prices of these intervals lie in {dq, . . . , dQ, dQ+1}, and U customers have been as-
signed intervals from {T1, . . . , Ti−1} (recall that a customer may be assigned multiple intervals if they are
priced differently). Clearly F (0, 1, 0) is the optimal value we are looking for. The base cases are easy: we
set F (Q + 1, i, U) = 0 for all i, U . For k ≥ i, let C(i, k, q) denote the set of customers who can afford to
buy an interval in {Ti, . . . , Tk} priced at dq . Set C(i, k, q) = ∅ for k < i.
Suppose we decide to set the price of intervals Ti, . . . , Tk to p = dq and assign t customers to these
intervals. Then, the best value that one can earn from intervals {Tk+1, . . . , Tℓ} is F (q + 1, k + 1, U +
t). Notice that this does not depend on which t customers are assigned intervals in Ti, . . . , Tk or how
these customers are allotted these intervals. Thus, we can compute the optimum assignment of intervals in
Ti, . . . , Tk to t customers separately. This is an interval packing problem which one can solve efficiently.
For j ∈ C(i, k, q), let ij be the largest index i′ ∈ {i, . . . , k} such that j can afford to buy Ti′ at price p = dq.
Notice that we may assume that in an optimal solution to this interval packing solution, if j is assigned an
interval, it is assigned Tij . Now we can formulate the following integer program for solving this interval
packing problem. For each j ∈ C(i, k, q), let Zj be an indicator variable that denotes if j is assigned interval
Tij . Then, we want to solve the following integer program.
max
∑
j∈C(i,k,q)
Zj max{dq − βj , 0} s.t.
∑
j
Zj = t,
∑
j:e∈Tij
Zj ≤ ce − U ∀e, Zj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j.
It is well known that an interval packing problem can be solved efficiently (e.g., by finding an optimal
solution to its LP-relaxation). Let P (i, k, q, t) be the optimal value of the above program, and −∞ if the
program is infeasible. Then we have the following recurrence.
F (q, i, U) = max
{
F (q + 1, k + 1, U + t) + P (i, k, q, t) : i− 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ, 0 ≤ t ≤ n
}
.
We need to compute O
(
(logm+log n)ℓn
)
table entries for F (·, ·, ·) to get the optimal value, and so this DP
can be implemented in polynomial time. Note that we can easily record the corresponding solution along
with the computation of each F (q, i, U).
Lemma 4.4. One can round any solution (x, y) to (P2) to an integer solution of objective value at least
(1− e−1)∑j pyjp.
Proof. Let (x, y) denote a feasible solution to (P2). Recall that pj(R) is the price j pays in the solution
R. For each j and each solution R ∈ ⋃iRi we can define values yij,R such that yij,R ≤ xi,R for all
i, j, R ∈ Ri, and yjp =
∑
i,R∈Ri,j,p
yij,R for all j, p. By making “clones” of a solution R ∈ Ri if necessary,
we can ensure that yij,R is either 0 or xi,R for every R ∈ Ri. The rounding is simple: independently, for
each half-clique Hi, we choose solution R ∈ Ri with probability xi,R. Let Qi denote the solution selected
for Hi. Now we assign each customer j to the Hi with maximum pj(Qi). Notice that this yields a feasible
solution for the instance composed of the union of the (half) cliques. The analysis is quite similar to the
analysis in [14] and [1]; we reproduce it here for completeness.
Fix a customer j. Let θi = Pr[yij,Qi > 0] =
∑
R∈Ri
yij,R. LetZij =
(∑
R∈Ri
yij,Rpj(R)
)
/
(∑
R∈Ri
yij,R
)
.
Note that
∑
i Zijθi =
∑
i
∑
R∈Ri
yij,Rpj(R) =
∑
p pyjp. Consider the sub-optimal way of assigning j to a
(random) R, where we assign j to the Hi with maximum Zij for which yij,Qi > 0; if there is no such i then
j is unassigned. Let k be the number of half-cliques, and let these be ordered so that Z1j ≥ Z2j ≥ . . . Zkj .
The expected price that j pays under this suboptimal assignment is
θ1Z1j + (1− θ1)θ2Z2j + . . .+ (1− θ1) · · · (1− θk−1)θkZkj
which following the analysis in [14] (for example) is at least (1− 1e
)∑
i Zijθi =
(
1− 1e
)∑
j,p pyjp. Thus,
the expected profit obtained is at least (1 − e−1)∑p pyjp. The algorithm can be derandomized using a
simple pipage rounding argument.
Proof of Corollary 1.3. As we mentioned in the introduction, the Max-Buy multi-product pricing problem
can be viewed as a non-SM highway problem, where there are m disjoint edges and each bidder has values
only on theses edges. As we did in the proof of Lemma 4.2, we write an LP of the form (P2), except that
we do not have to round the prices (note that the number of relevant positive prices on each edge is at most
the number of customer valuations on that edge). Then following the approach we used in the proof of
Lemma 4.4, we can solve the dual problem (D2) in polynomial time since a separation oracle reduces to the
voucher pricing problem on a single item which can be trivially solved in polynomial time.
The claim then follows immediately by combining this with the rounding procedure of Lemma 4.4.
Acknowledgment We thank Markus Bla¨ser for his valuable comments.
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A Proof of Theorem 3.8
We prove that the rounding algorithm described in Section 3.1, “Non-single minded tollbooth problem on
trees” is an O(1)-integrality-gap verifying algorithm for the new LP relaxation. Recall that this new LP-
relaxation for the SWM problem is derived from (P) by retaining only variables xj,S where S is a path of the
tree. More specifically, we prove that with α = 0.01 (as defined in the algorithm), the algorithm returns a
random integer solution xˆ such that Pr[xˆj,S = 1] ≥ 0.00425x∗j,S . This implies that E
[∑
j,S∈P vj(S)xˆj,S
] ≥
0.00425 ·∑j,S∈P vj(S)x∗j,S . (Recall that P is the collection of all paths of the tree.) Denote by ”≤” the
ordering defined in step 2 of the rounding procedure. This ordering has the following useful property.
Fact A.1. If two sets A, B ∈ P with A ≤ B share a common edge e, then they also share the path from e
up to the highest edge in B, i.e., the edge of B that is closest to the root.
Let Xj,S and Yj,S for j ∈ [n], S ∈ P to be two {0, 1}-random variables defined as follows: Xj,S := 1
if and only if S = Sj was assigned to customer j in step 1 of the procedure and and Yj,S = 1 if and only if
S survives in Step 2, that is, Sj = S and j ∈W . Note that, for S 6= ∅, Pr[Xj,S = 1] = αx∗j,S .
Now xˆ is defined by xˆj,Sj = 1 and xˆj,S = 0 for all S 6= Sj , j ∈W . We have
Pr
[
Yj,S = 1
]
= Pr
[
Xj,S = 1
] · Pr[Yj,S = 1 | Xj,S = 1
]
= αx∗j,S · Pr
[
Yj,S = 1 | Xj,S = 1
]
= αx∗j,S ·
(
1− Pr[Yj,S = 0 | Xj,S = 1
])
.
We will show that Pr
[
Yj,S = 0 | Xj,S = 1
]
, the probability of rejecting S in step 2, is bounded from above
by a constant.
Recall that path S is rejected in step 2 if its inclusion violates a capacity constraint at some of its edges.
It is natural now to apply a simple union bound on these events. Unfortunately, this bound turns out to be
too weak to prove a constant rejection probability. Instead, we only consider a small subset S′ ⊆ S and
show that the rejection probability is bounded from above by the probability that some capacity constraint
on S′ is violated by the sets chosen in step 1. Let v be the node in S closest to the root. We consider the two
branches of S that are split by v, separately. Let ℓ = (ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . ) denote one branch and r = (r1, r2, . . . )
the other one, where ℓ1 and r1 denote the edges of S incident to v. Note that r or ℓ could be empty if the
path only consists of a single branch. The edges of S′ along the first branch are now defined recursively:
ℓ′1 := ℓ1 and ℓ′i = ℓj where j = min{k | cℓk ≤ cℓ′i−1/2}, i.e., ℓ′i is the first edge after ℓ′i−1 along the branch
with less than half the capacity of ℓ′i−1. Similarly, we define the edges along the second branch: r′1 := r1
and r′i = rj such that j = min{k | crk ≤ cr′i−1/2}. So S′ =
(⋃
i ℓ
′
i
) ∪ (⋃i r′i
)
.
A bad event Ee at edge e occurs when
∑
j,A:e∈AXj,A ≥ ce/2. The next lemma shows that it is sufficient
to only consider bad events at the previously selected edges in S′.
Lemma A.2. For every customer j, we have
Pr[Yj,S = 0 | Xj,S = 1] ≤
∑
e∈S′
Pr[Ee].
Proof. Assume that S was rejected in step 2. In that case, there has to be an edge e ∈ S such that∑
j,A:e∈A Yj,A = ce, i.e., the number of paths picked prior to S that contain e equals ce and therefore
the inclusion of S would violate the capacity constraint on e. Let e′ be the next ancestor of e that is in S′
(an edge is also an ancestor of itself). Since the highest edge along each branch of S was included in S′,
such an edge e′ has to exist. Moreover, ce ≥ ce′/2: if e ∈ S′, then e = e′; otherwise by definition, we have
ce ≥ ce′/2. Now by Fact A.1, every set A that was considered in step 2 before S also contains e′. Hence,
we have
∑
j,A:e′∈A
Xj,A ≥
∑
j,A:e′∈A
Yj,A ≥
∑
j,A:e∈A
Yj,A = ce ≥ ce′/2.
Thus the bad event Ee′ occurs at edge e′. The result then follows from a simple union bound.
It remains to bound the probability of a bad event.
Lemma A.3. For α = 0.01, we have
∑
e∈S′ Pr
[Ee
] ≤ 0.575.
Proof. Consider an edge e. Define Zj =
∑
A:e∈AXj,A. Note that the random variables Z1, . . . , Zn are
independent. Then we have Pr
[Ee
]
= Pr
[∑
j Zj ≥ ce/2
]
.
By standard Chernoff bounds (see, e.g., [25, Theorem 4.1]), we get (with µ =∑j E[Zj ] ≤
∑
j
∑
A:e∈A E[Xj,A] =
α
∑
j
∑
A:e∈A x
∗
j,A ≤ αce)
Pr
[∑
j
Zj ≥ ce/2
]
= Pr
[∑
j
Zj ≥
(
1 +
ce − 2µ
2µ
)
µ
]
<
(2µ)ce/2ece/2−µ
c
ce/2
e
<
(
(2α)1/(2α)e
1−2α
2α
)αce (9)
< 0.231ce (since α = 0.01)
where inequality (9) is valid for α < 12 since the left hand side is monotonically increasing in µ for such
small µ. Finally, since the capacities of edges in S′ decrease by a factor of 2 along each of the two branches,
we get
∑
e∈S′ Pr
[Ee
] ≤ 2∑i≥0 0.2312
i ≤ 0.575.
Combining Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3, we get Pr
[
Yj,S = 1
] ≥ 0.00425x∗j,S . Hence, the expected
weight of xˆ is at least 0.00425 times the weight of x∗.
Remark A.4. In the case of uniform capacities, Lemma A.2 simplifies to just two summands on the right
hand side, that is, it is sufficient only to consider bad events on the first edge along each branch of S. Using
this observation, the approximation factor can be improved to 0.3.
